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Abstract	
This	paper	explores	the	silences	and	the	gaps	that	cut	through	witness	testimonies	at	the	
International	 Criminal	 Tribunal	 for	 Rwanda	 (ICTR)	 by	 applying	 a	 trauma	 lens	 to	 the	
narratives	 that	 emerge	 on	 the	 witness	 stand	 and	 by	 contrasting	 those	 with	 a	 survivor	
testimony.	It	compares	the	recollection	of	a	 traumatic	experience	with	the	production	of	
legal	meaning.	 To	 do	 so,	 it	 focuses	 specifically	 on	 a	 survivor	 testimony	 shared	with	 the	
author	at	the	Rwandan	Nyange	memorial	in	2014	where	the	crimes	in	question	happened,	
and	 the	 ICTR	The	Prosecutor	vs	Athanase	Seromba	 trial	 that	 relates	 to	 the	events	at	 that	
particular	 site.	 This	 paper	 shows	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 trauma	not	 only	 challenges	 the	
language	of	law	but	also	blurs	the	legal	narratives	and	functions	of	tribunals	like	the	ICTR.	
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Introduction	
This	 paper	 contrasts	 the	 recollection	 of	 a	 traumatic	 experience	 with	 the	 production	 of	 legal	
meaning.	To	do	 so,	 it	 analyses	 and	 compares	 a	 survivor	 testimony	 that	was	 conducted	at	 the	
Rwandan	Nyange	memorial	 in	 2014	 and	 the	The	Prosecutor	 vs	Athanase	Seromba	 case	 at	 the	
International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda	(ICTR).1	Between	10	and	16	April	1994	around	2,500	
people	were	murdered	or	bulldozed	to	death	in	the	Nyange	parish.	Jacques	is	a	survivor	of	these	
massacres	at	Nyange	church;	he	lost	his	wife	and	his	two	children	during	the	genocide	against	the	
Tutsi.2	His	recollection	of	this	traumatic	experience	will	be	contrasted	with	the	legal	account	of	
what	happened	in	Nyange	parish.	Father	Seromba	was	indicted	at	the	ICTR	for	crimes	against	
humanity	 and	 genocide;	 in	 2006	 the	 ICTR	 Trial	 Chamber	 III	 (hereafter	 the	 Chamber)	 found	
Seromba	 guilty	 of	 counts	 of	 genocide,	 conspiracy	 to	 commit	 genocide	 and	 crimes	 against	
humanity.		
	
The	article	applies	a	trauma	studies	lens	to	a	legal	phenomenon,	and	uses	the	insights	of	narrative	
studies	to	illuminate	legal	obscurities.	Applying	this	approach	is	important	because	what	must	be	
heard	in	court	cannot	be	articulated	by	legal	language	(Felman	2002).	This	paper	shows	that	the	
experience	of	trauma	not	only	challenges	the	language	of	law	but	also	blurs	the	legal	narrative	
and	functions	of	tribunals	like	the	ICTR.	
	
However,	 in	 pursuing	 such	 an	 inquiry,	 it	 should	 be	 acknowledged	 from	 the	 outset	 that	 the	
dialogue	 between	 the	 discipline	 of	 law,	 (poststructuralist)	 trauma	 and	 narrative	 studies	 is	
characterised	 by	 epistemological	 boundaries.	 Although	 a	 new	 awareness	 of	 trauma	 in	 legal	
practice	has	recently	emerged,	this	scholarship	has	been	limited	to	the	lawyer‐client	relationship	
and	 the	 impact	 greater	 trauma	 awareness	 might	 have	 on	 a	 victim’s	 mental	 health	 (see,	 for	
example,	Katz	and	Halder	2016).	What	is	often	forgotten	is	that	law	is	inherently	related	to	an	
injury,	which	was	the	central	insight	of	Felman’s	analysis	of	the	OJ	Simpson	case.	She	writes	‘the	
trial	has	attempted	to	articulate	the	trauma	so	as	to	control	its	damage’,	but	‘the	trial	has	become	
itself	a	vehicle	of	trauma,	a	vehicle	of	aggravation	of	traumatic	consequences	rather	than	a	means	
of	their	containment	and	their	legal	resolution’	(Felman	1997:	743).	In	a	similar	vein,	philosopher	
Francois	Lyotard,	reflecting	on	the	Holocaust,	warns	us	that	‘the	perfect	crime	does	not	consist	in	
killing	 the	 victim	or	 the	witnesses	…	but	 rather	 in	obtaining	 the	 silence	 of	 the	witnesses,	 the	
deafness	 of	 the	 judges	 and	 inconsistency	 of	 the	 testimony’	 (cited	 in	 Hirsh	 2001:	 536).	 Such	
insights	connect	to	central	aspects	of	this	article:	the	silences	and	the	traumatic	experiences	that	
cannot	be	heard	on	the	witness	stand.		
	
The	article	 is	developed	across	 three	sections.	The	 first	briefly	outlines	the	 function	of	ad	hoc	
tribunals	and	contrasts	those	with	the	functions	of	the	testimonial	process.	In	this	‘testimonial	
process’	the	person	who	has	experienced	violence	comes	into	existence	as	a	survivor	rather	than	
just	as	evidence	as	at	a	tribunal.	I	argue	it	is	the	mode	of	testimony	in	this	process	that	is	crucial	in	
understanding	 how	 the	 individual	 is	 positioned	 as	 a	 survivor	 in	 the	 testimonial	 process.	 The	
modes	of	testimony	construct	the	survivor	as	a	person	who	has	experienced	an	uncanny	event	
and	remembers	it	whereas	a	tribunal	constructs	the	witness	as	simple	evidence	to	make	the	legal	
case.	 This	 highlights	 the	 different	 structural	 preconditions	 in	which	 traumatic	 narratives	 are	
formulated.	 Therefore,	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	 section	 also	 engages	with	 the	 critical	work	 on	 the	
extent	to	which	international	criminal	trials	really	can,	and	do,	write	history	(see	Wilson	2011:	1,	
also	Gaynor	2012;	Simpson	2007).	The	analysis	contributes	to	these	critiques	by	revealing	the	
ways	in	which	fragments	of	the	past	are	at	best	side‐lined,	and	at	worst	silenced	or	eradicated,	
from	the	historical	account	the	trial	establishes.	
	
The	second	section	introduced	narrative	study	and	the	particularities	of	traumatic	narratives	and	
then	sets	out	 to	 read	 trauma	 into	and	 the	survivor	 testimony	against	 the	witness	 testimonies	
heard	in	trial.3	I	borrow	the	approach	of	reading	into	and	against	from	Shoshana	Felman	(1997,	
2002)	who	applies	this	particular	methodology	to	a	comparative	analysis	of	the	OJ	Simpson	and	
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the	Eichmann	trials.	Felman	reads	trauma	into	the	trials	themselves	and	in	the	analysis	thereof.	
In	addition,	she	reads	the	OJ	Simpson	trial	against	Tolstoy’s	novel	The	Kreutzer	Sonata.	Here,	I	
read	 the	 survivor	 testimony	 produced	 in	 the	 testimonial	 process	 against	 The	 Prosecutor	 vs	
Seromba	trial	(hereafter	the	Seromba	case)	and	read	trauma	into	both	narrative	accounts.	This	
particular	 methodological	 approach	 produces	 new	 knowledge	 on	 and	 insights	 into	 a	 legal	
phenomenon	that	cannot	be	explained	by	mere	legal	analysis	and	makes	visible	the	excluded,	the	
marginal	and	the	invisible.	To	do	so,	this	empirical	section	draws	on	excerpts	from	the	survivor	
testimony,	trial	witness	statements,4	cross‐examination	and	the	Seromba	judgment	to	illustrate	
the	argument.	I	show	that	the	traumatic	experience	is	eradicated	from	the	witness	stand	and	that	
it	is	instead	replaced	by	a	linear,	chronological,	factual	and	precise	narrative	account	in	order	to	
support	legal	meaning‐making.	The	third	section,	the	conclusion,	draws	together	these	findings	
and	relates	them	to	broader	discussions	of	trauma	and	law,	of	victims’	positions	in	international	
criminal	 trials,	 and	of	 how	history	 is	written	by	 international	 criminal	 trials,	 as	well	 as	 some	
ethical	reflections	on	writing	about	violence	and	trauma.		
	
It	 should	be	noted	 at	 the	outset	 that	 the	 survivor	 testimony	 and	 the	 legal	 trial	 do	not	 aim	 to	
produce	the	same	kind	of	conclusion,	nor	do	they	strive	towards	the	same	kind	of	effect	or	impact.	
The	trial	wants	and	needs	to	establish	the	truth	about	what	happened	and	its	judgment	suggests	
a	(illusionary)	finality	(Agamben	2008:	17‐19).	The	survivor	testimony,	in	contrast,	is	a	search	
for	meaning‐making,	a	search	for	expression	and	a	symbolic	understanding	of	an	uncanny	and	so	
often	unspeakable	past	(Felman	1997:	738;	Laub	1992,	1995).	The	analysis	of	the	Seromba	case	
is	not	meant	to	be	a	critique	of	the	trial	process	because	there	are	some	things	a	trial	cannot	do	
by	its	very	nature.	The	aim	is	to	read	narrative	and	trauma	into	a	legal	trial,	alongside	a	survivor	
testimony,	 in	order	 to	propose	a	new	methodology	that	allows	a	different	and,	 in	 fact,	deeper	
understanding	 of	 the	 trial	 process	 at	 international	 courts.	 Although	 the	 article	 illustrates	 its	
arguments	 by	 using	 and	 comparing	 one	 testimony	 and	 only	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 documents	
related	to	one	single	case	before	the	ICTR,	I	submit	that	such	an	approach	can	fruitfully	be	applied	
to	further	cases	within	the	ICTR,	as	well	as	other	international	and	domestic	trials,	in	order	to	
expose	the	quite	different	narratives	and	understandings	of	the	same	horrific	events.		
	
This	 article	 seeks	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 project	 of	 southern	 criminology	 by	 applying	 trauma,	
narrative	 studies	 and	 testimony	 to	 an	 international	 legal	 phenomenon.	 The	 inquiries	 of	
mainstream	criminology	largely	focus	on	the	global	North,	often	neglecting	patterns	of	violence,	
and	 the	 experiences	 and	 perceptions	 of	 violence,	 in	 the	 global	 South.	 This	 trend	 is	 perhaps	
surprising	given	that	most	intra‐state	conflicts	happen	in	the	so‐called	‘least	developed’	countries.	
As	Carrington	and	colleagues	acknowledge,	criminology	is	mainly	a	‘peace‐time	endeavour’	with	
much	of	the	research	focusing	on	‘justice	as	a	domestic	and	national	project’	(Carrington,	Hogg	
and	 Sozzo	 2016:	 3).	 At	 present,	 ciminology	 remains	 largely	 blind	 to	 the	 cultural	 and	
transformative	aspects	of	violence	and	post‐violence	contexts;	it	tends	to	ground	its	analysis	in	
metropolitan	 readings	 of	 delinquency	 and	 patterns	 of	 criminal	 behaviour	 in	 industrialised	
nations	(in	the	global	North).		
	
But	collective	violence	not	only	alters	social	relationships	and	communal	trust	but	also	the	ways	
its	 legacy	 is	understood	and	addressed,	 legally.	Crimes	on	a	 large	scale,	mainly	categorised	as	
crimes	against	humanity	and	genocide,	do	not	only	concern	the	individual	(legal)	responsibility	
of	 an	 ‘other’	 but,	 as	 Edgar	 Faure	 argues,	 concern	 ‘a	 criminal	 enterprise	 against	 the	 human	
condition’	 (cited	 in	 Hirsh	 2001:	 533).	 Similarly,	 Hannah	 Arendt	 has	 famously	 argued	 in	 the	
context	of	the	historical	Eichmann	trial	that	‘genocide	is	an	attack	upon	human	diversity	as	such,	
that	 is,	 upon	 characteristics	 of	 the	 “human	 status”	 without	 which	 the	 words	 “mankind”	 or	
“humanity”	would	be	devoid	meaning’	(Arendt	1994:	268‐69).	This	is	to	say,	writing,	addressing	
and	acting	upon	such	crimes	requires	us	to	look	beyond	metropolitan	readings	of	delinquency	
and	 criminal	 behaviour	 and	 to	 develop	 novel	 epistemological	 and	 legal	 tools	 of	 knowledge	
production	and	 inquiry.	This	paper	 therefore	wants	 to	promote	 thinking	about	mass	violence	
beyond	disciplinary	boundaries.		
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Functions	of	the	ICTR	and	of	the	testimonial	process		
Between	April	and	July	1994	approximately	one	million	people,	predominantly	Tutsi,	but	also	
moderate	Hutu,	were	killed	in	the	genocide	against	the	Tutsi.5	The	genocide	was	ended	by	military	
force	 by	 the	 Rwandan	 Patriotic	 Front	 (RPF)	 that	 was,	 at	 that	 time,	 a	 rebel	 movement.	 The	
International	 Criminal	 Tribunal	 for	 Rwanda	 (hereafter	 the	 Tribunal)	 was	 established	 by	 the	
United	Nations	in	1994	in	response	to	the	heinous	crimes	committed	in	Rwanda.	The	Tribunal	
aimed	to	prosecute	genocide	and	violations	of	human	rights	under	international	humanitarian	
law.	The	statute	provided	 the	Tribunal	with	 the	power	 to	prosecute	persons	believed	to	have	
committed	 genocide	 or	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 and	persons	 believed	 to	 have	 committed	 or	
ordered	 serious	 violations	of	Article	3	 of	 the	Geneva	 conventions	 (ICTR	Statute	 1994).6	More	
generally,	the	Tribunal	sought	to	fight	impunity,	establish	individual	responsibility	for	the	crimes	
committed,	and	deter	mass	atrocities	elsewhere	(see,	for	example,	Akhavan	2001;	Drumbl	2007).	
It	also	strived,	at	 least	rhetorically,	to	bring	peace	and	reconciliation	to	Rwanda	and	the	Great	
Lakes	 Region	 of	 Africa	 (Humphrey	 2003).7	 The	 Tribunal	 completed	 its	 last	 (appeal)	 case	 in	
November	 2015.	 According	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	 Mechanism	 for	 International	 Criminal	
Tribunals	website	 (http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal),	 the	 legacy	website	 of	 the	 ICTR,	 the	
Tribunal	 indicted	 a	 total	 of	 93	 individuals,	 including	 high‐ranking	 military	 and	 government	
officials	and	religious	and	media	leaders.		
	
The	evidentiary	foundation	of	the	Tribunal	and	its	function	to	produce	a	historical	record	of	the	
atrocities	are	 important	 considerations	of	 this	article.	As	with	regard	 to	 the	 latter,	 there	 is	an	
expectation	that	international	trials	produce	a	historical	record	of	what	happened	in	the	countries	
concerned	 (Gaynor	 2012;	 Osiel	 2012;	 Wilson	 2011).	 Israeli	 Prime	 Minister	 Ben‐Gurion,	 for	
example,	stressed	before	the	start	of	the	historical	Eichmann	trial	that	 ‘it	is	necessary	that	our	
youth	remember	what	happened	to	the	Jewish	people.	We	want	them	to	know	the	most	important	
facts	 of	 our	 history’	 (Arendt	 1994:	 10).	 Further	 still,	 war	 crime	 trials	 shape	 political	 life	 and	
collective	consciousness	through	the	‘juridical	memory’	they	produce	and	reproduce	(Simpson	
2007:	79).		
	
However,	the	desire	to	simultaneously	establish	the	criminal	liability	of	the	defendant	can	be	at	
odds	with	the	task	of	producing	a	historical	account	of	the	atrocities	that	took	place.	This	holds	
particularly	true	for	crimes	against	humanity	and	counts	of	genocide,	such	as	incitement	to	or	
conspiracy	 in	 genocide,	 where	 it	 is	 paramount	 for	 the	 prosecution	 and	 the	 Trial	 Chamber,	
respectively,	 to	 establish	 the	 broader	 historical	 context	 the	 crimes	 are	 embedded	 in	 and	 that	
made	 those	 heinous	 acts	 possible	 in	 the	 first	 place	 (Dembour	 and	Haslam	 2004;	 Osiel	 2012;	
Wilson	2011).	Simpson	concludes	on	this	point,	‘there	is	in	particular	a	tension	between	law	in	its	
history‐making	mode	and	law	in	is	judicial	mode’.	This	history‐making	function	of	international	
trials	is	supported	precisely	through	human	witnesses	(Gaynor	2012;	Simpson	2007).		
	
Since	 the	 Nuremberg	 trials,	 the	 evidentiary	 foundation	 in	 international	 criminal	 law	 has	
fundamentally	 changed	 (May	 and	Wierda	 1998/1999).	 Whereas	 the	 Nuremberg	 trial	 almost	
exclusively	relied	on	documentary	evidence,	the	more	recent	international	tribunals	heavily	rely	
on	 witnesses	 to	 build	 the	 legal	 case.	 The	 historical	 Eichmann	 trial	 was	 the	 first	 trial	 that	
introduced	 the	 human	 witness	 as	 part	 of	 the	 truth	 finding	 endeavour.	 It	 sought	 not	 only	 to	
establish	facts	but	also	to	use	law	to	transmit	the	uncanny	history	as	an	experience,	as	a	tool	of	
unimaginable	facts	and	as	a	tool	of	communication	(Felman	2002:	133).		
	
Even	though	the	human	witness	gives	rise	 to	 the	vulnerability	of	establishing	a	 truth	 ‘beyond	
reasonable	 doubt’	 (Felman	 2002:	 134),	 the	 recent	 international	 trials	 heavily	 rely	 on	 human	
witnesses	(May	and	Wierda	1998/1999:	743;	see	also	Combs	2016).	In	fact,	witnesses	are	the	
pillar	 of	 international	 criminal	 trials.	 This	development	 is	partly	 due	 to	 the	 complexity	of	 the	
crimes	 they	 prosecute.	 Without	 human	 witnesses	 those	 trials	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 produce	
probative	evidence	of	‘what	happened’	(Wilson	2011).		
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Crucial	for	the	purpose	of	this	article	is	that	witnesses	are	treated	as	mere	evidence	in	the	case	of	
the	ICTR.	The	Tribunal’s	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(adopted	in	1995	and	subsequently	
updated)	 (hereafter,	 the	 Rules)	 do	 not	 define	 the	 witness	 other	 than	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
admissibility	 of	 evidence.	 The	 same	 holds	 true	 for	 the	 Seromba	 judgment	 that	 only	 refers	 to	
witness	 statements	 as	 exculpatory	 or	 probative	 evidence.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 witness	 is	
desubjectified.	In	a	similar	context,	Jonneke	Koomen	(2013)	found	that	witness	statements	that	
were	collected	in	the	field	by	Tribunal	investigators	were	already	then	the	product	of	encounters	
and	hierarchies	in	the	field.	In	addition,	by	couching	witness	statements,	collected	in	the	field,	into	
a	 chronological	 timeframe	 in	 order	 to	 give	 them	 legal	meaning,	 the	 human	 experience	 of	 the	
atrocity	has	already	been	eradicated	in	that	early	stage	of	the	trial	process.8		
	
In	what	I	call	the	‘testimonial	process’	however,	the	narrativization	of	the	traumatic	experience	
can	unfold.	 In	and	 through	 this	process,	 the	person	who	has	experienced	violence	comes	 into	
existence	as	a	survivor	rather	than	just	as	evidence.9	I	argue	it	is	the	mode	of	testimony	 in	this	
particular	process	that	is	crucial	in	understanding	how	the	individual	is	positioned	as	a	survivor.	
In	 explaining	 how	 this	 is	 so,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 draw	 on	Holocaust	 studies,	 particularly	 on	 those	
studies	that	examine	survivor	testimonies.	One	characteristic	of	a	traumatic	experience	such	as	
the	genocide	in	Rwanda	or	detention	in	concentration	camps	is	that	the	self	is	annihilated	and	the	
story	is	neither	told	nor	remembered.	The	experience	becomes	‘absent’,	as	something	that	has	
yet	to	be	experienced	(Laub	2005:	257),	or	remains	an	‘unclaimed	experience’	(Caruth	1996).	In	
the	process	of	giving	testimony	this	becomes	part	of	the	social	world.	In	their	pioneering	work,	
Dori	Laub	and	Shoshana	Felman	speak	of	giving	testimony	as	a	social	process	that	requires	a	great	
deal	of	attention	and	careful	listening	(1992:	70).	In	addition	this	process	requires	a	listener	who	
recognises	and	reaffirms	the	realness	of	the	story	told	(Laub	and	Felman	1992:	68).	Testimony	
can	 therefore	 be	 understood	 as	 storytelling	 to	 an	 emphatic	 other.	 Moreover,	 Laub	 (2005)	
develops	 different	 characteristics	 such	 as	 the	 dialogical	 relationship	 between	 survivor	 and	
listener,	the	reaffirmation	of	the	story	and	the	secret	‘password’	that	together	form	the	necessary	
holding	 space	 to	 set	 in	motion	 the	narrativization	 of	 the	 traumatic	 experience.10	All	 together,	
these	particularities	form	what	I	define	as	the	mode	of	testimony	that	is	crucial	for	the	testimonial	
process.		
	
This	article	draws	upon	my	wider	research	on	memorialisation	and	transitional	justice	in	post‐
genocide	Rwanda.	I	sought	to	speak	to	people	who	had	experienced	the	genocide,	with	the	aim	of	
collecting	 ‘survivor	 testimonies’	 from	 particular	 memorial	 sites	 and	 comparing	 individual	
narratives	of	what	happened	with	official	narratives	and	‘architectonical’	narratives	inscribed	in	
the	 materiality	 of	 the	 memorial	 sites	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Viebach	 2014).	 I	 did	 not	 select	
interviewees	in	a	structured	way	but	asked	‘care‐takers’	(Viebach	2014)	if	they	wanted	to	share	
their	memories	with	me.	 I	defined	 ‘care‐takers’	as	survivors	who	work	pro	bono	cleaning	and	
preserving	the	human	remains	and	dead	bodies	that	are	displayed	in	so	many	of	the	memorials.11	
I	also	differentiated	between	those	 ‘care‐takers’	and	official	memorial	staff	who	would	usually	
work	for	the	Rwandan	Commission	for	the	Fight	Against	Genocide	(CNLG)	and	would	conduct,	at	
least	at	the	national	and	bigger	memorials,	the	tours	for	visitors.12	
	
Moreover,	I	also	spoke	to	survivors	who	did	not	work	as	‘care‐takers’	at	the	memorials,	though	
they	had	experienced	the	massacres	at	the	particular	sites.	I	chose	national	memorial	sites	as	well	
as	 very	 remote	 memorials	 mainly	 unknown	 to	 outsiders	 (for	 example,	 at	 Kanduha,	 Kinazi,	
Cyahinda	or	Cyanika).	In	addition,	I	covered	the	different	provinces	so	as	to	have	a	geographical	
balance,	something	which	is	particularly	important	given	that	the	genocide	played	out	differently	
across	 the	 provinces.	 In	 total,	 I	 interviewed	 around	 40	 individuals,	 including	 ‘care‐takers’,	
memorial	staff,	 staff	of	survivor	organisations	such	as	 Ibuka	and	Avega,	staff	of	 the	CNLG	and	
individuals	 remotely	 involved	 in	 commemoration	 and	 the	 memorials.	 I	 also	 conducted	 two	
additional	 focus	 group	 discussions	with	 female	 survivors.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 article	 it	 is	
important	to	note	that	I	only	conducted	five	survivor	testimonies	that	are	related	to	massacres	in	
Nyange,	Gisenyi,	Kanduha,	Bisesero	and	Nyanza.13	The	Nyange	church	survivor	testimony	and	the	
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associated	Seromba	case	was	chosen	because	it	is	illustrative	of	the	overarching	argument	of	this	
article.14	
	
In	 summary,	 this	 section	 has	 discussed	 the	 different	 functions	 of	 trials	 and	 the	 testimonial	
process.	This	highlights	the	dissimilar	structural	preconditions	in	which	traumatic	narratives	are	
formulated.	As	explored	in	the	next	section,	this	deeply	affects	the	ways	in	which	such	narratives	
are	(mis)understood	and	interpreted.	
	
Narratives	 beyond	 time	 and	 space:	 Reading	 traumatic	 testimony	 into	 and	 against	 the	
witness	stand	
In	order	to	highlight	the	ways	in	which	the	events	of	10‐16	April	1994	in	the	Nyange	parish	are	
narrated	in	the	two	settings,	I	first	turn	to	general	ideas	on	narrative	and	the	shape	of	traumatic	
testimony.		
	
The	core	of	any	narrative	and	storytelling	is	the	plot.	It	forms	the	causal	link	between	events	in	a	
story,	functions	as	the	structure	of	the	story,	and	the	means	by	which	otherwise	mere	occurrences	
are	made	into	moments	of	the	unfolding	of	the	story	(Polletta	et	al	2011:	111).	At	the	same	time,	
narratives	are	a	form	of	discourse	and	can	be	identified	by	their	structural	and	formal	features	
(Polletta	 et	 al	 2011:	 112).	 One	 of	 these	 formal	 features	 is	 what	 is	 termed	 the	 ‘Aristotelian	
configuration’	 (Ricoeur	 1984).	 Ricoeur	 argues	 that	 when	 stories	 are	 told	 there	 is	 a	 certain	
pressure	 to	 deliver	 them	 within	 an	 Aristotelian	 conventional	 narrative	 configuration,	 one	 in	
which	concordance	looms	large,	where	there	is	a	sense	of	the	connection	between	events,	and	
where	 the	conclusion	 is	 ‘congruent	with	 the	episodes	brought	 together	by	 the	story’	 (Ricoeur	
1984:	67).	Thus,	stories	are	narratives	told	according	to	the	conventions	of	linearity,	continuity,	
closure	 and	 omniscience	 that	 are	 often	 taken	 as	 a	 quasi‐natural	 condition	 of	 narrative	
(Brockmeier	2008:	28,	in	Andrews	2014:	152).	There	is,	Ricoeur	suggests,	always	a	pressure	to	
transform	a	chain	of	events	into	a	meaningful	whole.	Moreover,	only	when	stories	are	emplotted	
can	our	lives,	our	experiences,	become	meaningful.	He	writes,	‘we	tell	our	stories	because	in	the	
last	analysis	human	lives	need	and	merit	being	narrated.	This	remark	takes	on	its	full	force	when	
we	refer	to	the	necessity	to	save	the	history	of	the	defeated	and	the	lost.	The	whole	history	of	
suffering	cries	out	for	vengeance	and	a	call	for	narrative’	(Ricoeur	1984:	75).		
	
Part	of	 this	 ‘wholeness’	 is	time:	 time	 lies	at	 the	heart	of	narrative.	On	this	point,	 Jenny	Edkins	
describes	the	linear	or	narrative	time:	
	
…	 is	 a	 notion	 that	 exists	 because	 we	 all	 work,	 in	 and	 through	 our	 everyday	
practices,	to	bring	it	into	being	…	the	production	and	reproduction	of	linear	time	
take	place	by	people	assuming	that	such	a	form	of	times	does	exist,	and	specifically	
that	it	exists	as	an	empty,	homogenous	medium	in	which	events	take	place.	(Edkins	
2003:	xiv‐xv)		
	
Further,	she	explains	that	language,	and	thus	narrative,	is	inevitably	linked	to	social	structure	and	
power:	language	is	part	of	the	social	order,	so	that	when	this	order	falls	apart	during	genocide	or	
mass	 atrocity,	 so	 does	 language	 (Edkins	 2003:	 8;	 see	 also	 Scarry	 1985).	 In	 that	 sense,	 the	
traumatic	 experience	keeps	one	 from	 forming	 a	meaningful	 narrative.	Narrative	 time	and	 the	
‘wholeness’	of	 the	story	delivered	by	 its	conventional	configuration	 is	precisely	what	makes	a	
traumatic	narrative	so	difficult	to	convey.	The	trauma	does	not	fit	into	this	conventional	narrative	
form.		
	
Now,	 juxtaposing	 trauma	 and	 narrative,	 I	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 the	 traumatic	 occurrence	 that	 the	
narrator	fails	to	integrate	into	a	plot,	into	a	conventional	narrative	form.	Developing	this	further,	
it	is	helpful	to	return	to	trauma	and	Holocaust	studies	again.	Cathy	Caruth	explains,	for	instance,	
that	trauma	is	always	a	story	of	a	wound	that	cries	out	rather	than	a	mere	pathology.	It	is	a	story	
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‘that	addresses	us	 in	the	attempt	to	tell	us	of	a	reality	or	truth	that	 is	not	otherwise	available’	
(Caruth	1996:	4).	She	further	argues	that	the	truth	in	its	belated	character	cannot	be	linked	only	
to	what	is	known,	but	also	to	what	remains	unknown	in	our	very	actions	and	our	language.	To	
compound	the	point	further,	Caruth	maintains	that	‘the	story	of	trauma	…	far	from	telling	of	an	
escape	from	reality	–	the	escape	from	a	death,	or	from	its	referential	force	–	rather	attests	to	its	
endless	impact	on	a	life’	(Caruth	1996:	6).	
	
The	core	of	understanding	traumatic	narratives,	therefore,	 is	that	neither	the	narrator	nor	the	
listener	knows	what	is	yet	to	be	said	or	cannot	be	said.	Despite	a	vast	amount	of	documents	or	
other	evidence,	the	listener	to	a	traumatic	story	faces	a	situation	where	he	or	she	comes	to	look	
for	something	that	is	in	fact	non‐existent	since	it	is	a	record	that	has	yet	to	be	made	(Laub	1992:	
57).	
	
Against	this	backdrop,	we	can	now	explore	and	read	the	traumatic	narratives	on	the	witness	stand	
and	in	the	testimonial	process	against	each	other.		
	
Form,	structure,	facts	and	an	experience	
Let	us	start	with	some	 ideas	around	 the	 form	and	structure	of	narrative	accounts	as	 they	are	
produced	in	court.	David	Hirsch	(2001:	530),	drawing	on	the	trial	of	Andrei	Sawoniuk,15	observes	
that	the	memoir	is	acted	upon	by	the	rules	and	norms	of	the	legal	processes,	particularly	by	the	
process	of	cross‐examination	and	by	that	of	the	sifting	out	of	evidence	which	 is	deemed	to	be	
inadmissible.	In	the	courtroom,	the	narrative	takes	a	specific	form:	here,	a	‘law‐type’	statement	
invites	negotiation	of	meaning	with	falsification	and	verification	such	as	by	asking	witnesses	on	
the	witness	stand	questions	such	as	 ‘are	you	sure’	or	 ‘I	have	heard	you	saying	 this	differently	
before’,	or	‘evidence	suggest’.	This	excerpt	from	a	cross‐examination	of	a	defence	witness	by	the	
prosecutor	 is	very	 illustrative	of	 this	 ‘law‐type’	 form.	The	witness	CBR	has	participated	 in	 the	
killings	at	Nyange	church	(TRA03317/1):		
	
Q.	 I	wish	to	refer	to	the	transcripts	of	the	last	session	and	I	shall	also	refer	to	
the	written	statements,	and	we	are	 looking	at	page	24	and	page	25	of	the	
transcripts	…	Mr	Moss	put	a	question	to	the	witness	in	regard	to	the	day	of	
Friday,	 the	 15th	 of	 April	 …	 ‘The	 name	 of	 the	 priest	 who	 was	 with	 the	
gendarmes,	was	that	name	mentioned	by	your	leader?’		
Now	Mr	Moses’s	 question	 concerning	 that	 episode:	 ‘Was	 the	name	of	 the	
priest	 who	 was	 with	 the	 gendarmes,	 was	 that	 name	 mentioned	 by	 your	
leader?	Answer:	Yes.	They	mentioned	the	name	of	the	priest	Ndugutse.	They	
didn't	even	tell	us	the	name	of	the	priest,	whether	it	was	a	father	or	priest,	
they	were	saying	Seromba	and	they	said	that	Seromba	did	not	allow	us	to	get	
into	the	courtyard	of	the	presbytery	before	we	removed	this	filth’.	
Now,	 Mr.	Witness,	 you	 made	 that	 statement	 on	 Friday.	 Do	 you	 admit	 to	
having	made	this	statement,	which	was	recorded	by	the	stenographers?	
A.	 Yes,	I	can	confirm	having	made	that	statement	concerning	that	Friday,	as	you	
have	stated,	because	 the	person	who	was	asking	me	questions	wondered	
whether	the	name	of	the	father	had	been	mentioned,	and	I	said	that	that	was	
the	case.	
Q.	 In	other	words,	you	confirm	that	the	words	you	spoke	regarding	your	leader,	
the	words	were	[pause]	 they	said	that,	 ‘Seromba	did	not	even	allow	us	to	
enter	the	courtyard	of	the	presbytery	before	we	removed	the	filth’.	I've	read	
it	again.	
A.	 Yes,	that	was	what	was	said.	It	was,	in	fact,	the	time	when	the	priest	had	not	
allowed	or	prevented	the	people	to	enter	the	courtyard	of	the	presbytery,	
they	were	asking	for	the	killings	to	stop	…	
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Q.	 Do	you	confirm	that	you	yourself	[pause]	do	you	confirm	that	it	was	your	
leaders	who	went	to	see	the	priest	and	you	were	outside?	Is	that	what	you	
are	saying?	
A.	 Yes.	
Q.	 Thank	you.	I	want	to	refer	now	to	page	39,	and	here	you	are	being	cross‐
examined	 by	 Defence	 counsel	 regarding	 the	 same	 circumstances	 …	 In	
relation	to	that	incident,	where	the	priest	sent	back	your	leaders	at	the	gates	
to	the	presbytery,	this	time	around	you	said	…:	‘He	stopped	them	from	doing	
so.	He	asked	them	what	they	wanted,	and	the	authorities	told	him	that	they	
wanted	to	kill	the	refugees	who	were	in	that	part.	He	told	them,	“Listen,	look	
around,	first	of	all,	clear	this	filth”.	There	were	dead	bodies	and	bricks.’		
The	 same	 circumstance,	 the	 same	 incident	 that	 you	 are	 referring	 to	 now,	
when	you	were	being	examined	by	the	Prosecutor,	it	was	your	leaders	who	
said	that	Seromba	did	not	want	to	let	you	kill	the	refugees	before	you	clear	
the	filth.		
Now,	the	same	incident,	you	place	in	the	mouth	of	the	priest	the	following,	
he	said,	‘Listen,	look	around	and	clear	this	filth’.	First	of	all,	what	is	the	true	
situation?	
A.	 Yes,	but	the	two	versions	are	not	different.	…		
	
It	becomes	apparent	through	the	cross‐examination	of	witness	CBR,	the	prosecution	attempts	to	
transform	what	Hirsch	(2001)	labelled	the	‘memoir’	of	the	witness	into	evidence.	However,	here	
the	prosecution	attempts	to	undermine	the	credibility	of	the	witness	by	referring	to	statements	
made	in	the	direct	examination	of	CBR	by	the	defence	council	(DC)	the	party	which	had	called	him	
as	a	witness	 (a	 stage	 of	 the	process	 known	as	 the	 examination‐in‐chief).	The	narrative	of	 the	
witness	is	put	under	scrutiny	and	the	meaning	of	the	content	is	heavily	debated	between	him	and	
the	 prosecutor.	 In	 that	 process	 the	 ‘evidence’	 or	 the	 account	 of	 the	 witness	 is	 rendered	
inadmissible.		
	
In	the	testimonial	process,	however,	narratives	take	an	open	form	encouraged	by	the	intimate	
relationship	between	listener	and	survivor.	For	 instance,	as	an	interviewer,	 I	would	never	ask	
closed	questions	or	direct	the	testimony	in	a	certain	direction	or	press	it	in	a	conventional	form.	
Turning	back	to	the	court,	Hirsch	(2001)	further	states	that,	in	the	process	of	forming	memoir	
into	evidence,	criminal	trials	give	extraordinary	events	a	routine	form:	they	abstract,	shape	and	
civilise	them.	For	Jacques	the	genocide	is	clearly	an	extraordinary	event	that	has	fundamentally	
changed	his	life	and	altered	his	being	in	the	world.	In	his	testimony	to	the	author,	he	says:	
	
…	 it	 [referring	 to	 the	memorial,	 the	 church]	 is	very	 touching;	 I	 remember	what	
happened	here	and	I	imagine	how	they	[his	family]	were	killed	…	I	had	so	much	
fear	when	I	came	back	…	Every	year	at	commemoration	we	bury	remains.	Every	
year	we	found	bodies	and	we	dig	new	graves.		
	
His	account	indicates	that	the	remembrance	of	the	‘event’	does	not	know	an	ending	and	that,	even	
after	20	years	[at	time	of	testimony],	they	still	find	bodies	that	need	to	be	buried.	In	contrast,	the	
Seromba	judgment	states,	‘following	his	order,	an	attack	was	launched	against	the	refugees	by	the	
Interahamwe,	militiamen,	gendarmes	and	communal	police	officers,	equipped	with	traditional	
weapons	 and	 firearms,	 causing	 the	 deaths	 of	 numerous	 refugees	 [emphasis	 added]’	 (Seromba	
Judgment,	01‐66‐0276/2:	para	19,	p.	37).	Here,	the	Chamber	talks	of	 ‘traditional	weapons	and	
‘causing	the	deaths	of	numerous	refugees’.	This	is	clearly,	in	the	words	of	Hirsch,	a	‘civilised’	form	
of	describing	the	death	of	thousands	of	people,	some	of	whom	were	bulldozed	alive	whilst	being	
trapped	in	the	church.	The	use	of	‘traditional	weapons’	refers	to	clubs	and	machetes	that	were	
predominantly	 used	 by	 the	 Interahamwe16	 to	 kill	 people.	 Generally,	 this	 way	 of	 dying	 was	
described	to	me	in	research	interviews	as	‘animalic’,	a	‘death	without	dignity’.17	Jacques	reaffirms	
what	is	means	to	die	from	a	machete,	when	he	says,	‘I	chose	to	be	drowned	instead	of	being	killed	
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by	machetes.	After	what	I	saw	here,	dead	bodies	everywhere,	people	hacked	into	pieces,	I	really	
wanted	to	die’.18	
	
In	addition,	law	understands	facts	restrictively,	which	means	that	the	collection	of	legal	evidence	
privileges	 positive	 or	 objective	 facts.	 Facts	 are	 only	 considered	 as	 such	 if	 they	 are	 precise,	
pedantic	and	quantifiable,	and	structured	within	a	true/false	dichotomy	(Dembour	and	Haslam	
2004:	163).	For	example,	the	cross‐examination	by	the	defence	of	witness	SE13	on	7	April	2006	
illustrates	how	narratives	of	a	true/false	dichotomy	emerge	on	the	witness	stand	(TRA0037701):	
	
Q.	 Witness,	on	that	day,	16th	April	1994,	did	you	see	Father	Athanase	Seromba,	
while	Nyange	church	[pause]	was	being	destroyed?		
A.	 On	that	day,	I	did	see	Father	Seromba.		
Q.	 Witness	 SE13,	 you	 told	 us	 during	 your	 testimony	 this	 morning,	 that	 the	
bourgmestre	had	requisitioned	gendarmes	from	the	préfecture	to	bring	them	
to	Nyange;	is	that	correct?		
A.	 Yes,	you	are	right.		
Q.	 They	were	supposed	to	provide	for	the	safety	of	the	refugees	at	the	parish;	
is	that	right?		
A.	 Yes,	that	was	why	they	were	at	the	church.		
Q.	 Did	 you	 see	 them	 on	 the	 16th	 of	 April	 while	 the	 church	 was	 being	
demolished?		
A.	 They	were	present	and	there	were	four	of	them.		
	
The	defence	counsel,	Mr	Monthé,	attempts	to	establish	positive	and	objective	facts	by	frequently	
asking	 witness	 SE13,	 ‘is	 that	 correct?’	 or	 ‘is	 that	 right?’	 He	 thereby	 reduces	 the	 events	 to	
singularities	 of	 objective	 facts	 and	 creates	 a	 binary	 and	 very	 simplistic	 narrative	 that	 fits	 the	
conventional	narrative	feature.	The	witness	testimony	continues:	
	
Q.	 Witness	SE13,	can	you	explain	to	the	Chamber,	the	circumstances	and	the	
atmosphere	 in	 which	 the	 church	 was	 demolished?	 You	 state	 that	
Nkinamubanzi	 was	 there,	 and	 that	 he	 was	 driving	 the	 bulldozer.	 What	
happened	thereafter?	Did	you	remain	there	to	observe	what	happened?		
A.	 Assailants	had	come	from	practically	everywhere.	The	doors	to	the	church	
were	 locked,	 and	 the	 refugees	 inside	 had	 barricaded	 the	 entrance	 of	 the	
doors	with	benches,	such	that	they	could	not	be	opened.	The	people	outside	
the	church	could	not	go	inside	to	find	[pause]	or	to	get	at	the	refugees.	That	
is	why	they	were	throwing	stones	at	the	window	panes	above	the	doors.	So,	
above	the	doors	were	window	panes.	It	is	true	they	had	difficulty	throwing	
stones.	 There	was	 total	 chaos	 outside.	 People	were	 trying	 to	 get	 into	 the	
church,	and	they	were	waiting	for	people	to	come	out	so	that	they	could	kill	
them.		
Q.	 Do	you	think	Anasthase	Nkinamubanzi19	could	have	avoided	the	killings	at	
Nyange	church,	you	who	are	present,	do	you	think	he	could	have	avoided	
destroying	Nyange	church?		
A.	 Not	only	was	Nkinamubanzi	from	our	region,	but	even	those	of	us	who	are	
from	the	same	commune	could	not	stop	people	from	doing	what	they	had	to	
do	 as	 of	 the	 12th	 of	 April.	 Apart	 from	 those	who	were	 inside	 the	 church	
[pause]	those	who	had	sought	refuge	in	their	homes	had	been	killed.	People	
were	bloodthirsty	 and	 just	 being	before	 them	posed	 a	 problem.	Those	 in	
charge	of	security	were	present	and	they	participated	in	the	activities	that	
were	unfolding	there.	That	is	why	I	said	that	Kinamubanzi	could	not	have	
disobeyed	the	orders	to	destroy	the	church.	
Q.	 Witness	 SE13,	 can	 you	 be	 more	 precise?	 When	 you	 say	 people	 were	
bloodthirsty,	what	do	you	mean?	Can	you	be	more	specific?		
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A.	 When	insecurity	threatened	our	commune,	there	were	certain	people	who	
engaged	in	those	activities.	When	I	say	that	people	were	bloodthirsty,	I	am	
referring	to	those	who	carried	out	killings.	Usually,	there	were	hoodlums	on	
the	hills	who	heeded	no	advice.	When	they	started	killing	people,	they	didn't	
stop;	they	continued.	That	is	why	I	say	that	those	hooligans	had	killed,	those	
on	the	hills,	and	they	knew	that	only	the	refugees	in	the	church	had	not	been	
killed.	So	they	came	to	kill	them.	They	were	present	and	no	one	could	stop	
them	from	executing	the	orders	they	had	received.	
	
In	this	extract,	witness	SE13	is	directed	to	establish	precise	and	objective	facts.	When	he	talks	
about	people	being	‘bloodthirsty’,	the	DC	pushes	him	to	define	what	he	means	by	it.	Questions	are	
asked	in	a	linear	structure,	where	the	single	events	and	circumstances	are	‘emplotted’	in	a	chain	
of	events	that	suggest	an	allegedly	wholeness	of	the	narrative	emerging	on	the	witness	stand.	The	
DC	obviously	wants	to	establish	the	‘fact’	that	the	massacre	on	15	April	and	the	bulldozing	of	the	
church	the	following	day	could	not	have	been	prevented	by	the	defendant,	priest	Seromba.		
	
In	contrast,	Jacques’	testimony	neither	refers	to	facts	nor	to	a	precise	or	quantifiable	true/false	
dichotomy.	Consider,	for	example,	this	longer	excerpt	from	this	testimony	that	describes	the	early	
days	of	the	‘events’	at	the	Kivumu	commune:	
	
When	 the	 plane	 crashed	 [in]	 this	 district	 of	 Nyange	 they	 started	 to	 kill	 in	 the	
commune	 Kivumu.	 The	 church	 was	 called	 Nyange.	 On	 10	 April	 they	 killed	 the	
achronomyst	of	the	commune.	The	same	day	the	préfet	called	the	bourgemestres	of	
different	communes	to	make	plans	how	to	kill	the	Tutsi	and	to	encourage	them.	
The	next	day	on	11	April	 the	bourgemestre	of	Kivumu	assembled	authorities	 to	
pass	instructions	from	the	préfet.	On	the	same	day	after	the	meeting	they	sent	a	
letter	 to	me	because	 I	was	a	business	man	at	 that	 time.	The	 letter	said	 that	 the	
authorities	would	need	my	car.	The	letter	reads	‘according	to	the	security	meeting	
you	have	 to	bring	your	 car	 on	11	April	 today	at	 4.15pm	 for	 the	 security	 of	 the	
commune’	 [Jacques	 actually	 showed	 me	 the	 letter	 that	 he	 kept	 ever	 since	 he	
received	 it.]	Despite	of	so	many	Hutus	having	cars,	 I	was	the	only	one	who	was	
asked.	 I	brought	 the	 car	 to	 the	Komini	and	 they	asked	me	 to	drive	 them	 to	 the	
border	of	the	commune	Kivumu/Kibirira	but	I	asked	why	they	made	me	do	this.	So	
I	gave	them	my	driver,	because	I	didn’t	believe	them	...	I	was	glad	I	didn’t	go	because	
they	could	have	killed	me.	After	giving	his	car	away	on	the	12	April	 the	killings	
officially	started.	They	started	killing	in	the	villages,	so	people	sought	refuge	in	the	
church.	They	used	my	car	to	take	the	people	from	the	villages	to	the	church.	They	
told	Tutsi	they	were	safe	in	the	church.	Even	those	who	were	hiding	believed	them	
and	went	to	seek	refuge	in	the	church.	
	
In	this	account	of	the	events	between	10	and	11	April,	Jacques	refers	to	information	that	he	cannot	
possibly	know	or	have	witnessed	himself	(‘hearsay’	evidence,	in	legal	terms).	He	was	hiding	with	
neighbours	and	only	came	 to	 the	Nyange	church	on	13	April.	Reading	his	 testimony	 from	the	
standpoint	of	facts,	precision	and	true/false	dichotomy,	he	cannot	know	what	they	did	with	this	
truck	because	he	gave	it	to	his	driver.	He	also	was	not	at	the	meetings	he	describes.	We	also	never	
learn	how	he	convinced	‘them’	to	let	him	go	after	he	gave	‘them’	his	truck	or	if	his	driver	actually	
delivered	the	truck.20	We	also	do	not	get	to	know	who	‘they’	in	his	account	are.	He	refers	to	both	
Hutu	more	 generally	 and	 to	 authorities	 and	 ‘they’	who	 started	 killing	 Tutsi.	 Yet,	 he	 refers	 to	
common	knowledge	and	broader	social	narratives	of	what	happened	on	those	days	that	fed	into	
his	own	narrative	account	and	how	he	remembers	what	happened.		
	
Giving	testimony	is	always	more	than	simply	narrate	or	to	report	a	fact	or	an	event,	even	to	relate	
an	experience.	We	can	understand	Jacques’	testimony	more	generally	as	what	Felman	refers	to	
as	a	 ‘responsibility	to	truth’	(Felman	2014:	322):	 ‘to	speak	from	within	the	 legal	pledge	of	the	
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witness	oath,	whether	one	is	actually	on	the	witness	stand	or	not,	whether	one	is	in	a	trial	or	one	
is	 in	the	court	of	history’.	 In	this	sense,	 to	 testify	 is	always	metaphorically	 to	take	the	witness	
stand,	and	the	narrative	account	of	the	witness	is	engaged	in	both	an	oath	and	a	commitment	to	
one’s	own	narrative	that	addresses	the	other.	Jacques	neither	simply	reports	facts	or	events,	nor	
is	he	referring	to	a	factual	truth.	His	testimony	is	a	responsibility	to	a	truth	that	is	defined	by	how	
he	remembers	the	events.		
	
The	courts	in	contrast	may	produce	a	vast	number	of	facts,	but	the	traumatic	experience	remains	
silent.	In	the	Seromba	case,	for	instance,	it	was	difficult	for	the	Chamber	to	establish	the	exact	
number	of	bulldozers	that	were	used	on	16	April	to	destroy	the	church	and	to	kill	Tutsi	hiding	in	
the	 church.	 On	 that	 point	 the	 judgment	 compounds,	 ‘13	 witnesses	 testified	 to	 having	 seen	 a	
bulldozer	 at	 Nyange	 church,	 while	 7	 others	 mentioned	 the	 presence	 of	 two	 bulldozers’.	 The	
Chamber	 finds	 that	 the	discrepancy	between	 the	 accounts	 is	 due	 to	 the	 difficulty	 they	had	 in	
‘identifying	the	type	of	vehicles	present	at	Nyange	church’	(Seromba	Judgment,	01‐66‐0276/2:	
para	206,	p.	59).	At	another	point	in	the	judgment	the	Chamber	dismisses	the	testimony	of	witness	
BZ4	because,	‘his	testimony	lacks	precision	with	respect	to	the	sequence	of	the	events	[emphasis	
added]’.	The	Chamber	further	notes,	‘he	was	unable	to	recall	the	exact	time	of	his	arrival	or	the	
arrival	of	the	bulldozer	[emphasis	added]’	(Seromba	Judgment,	01‐66‐0276/2:	para	259,	p.73).	
Under	 the	same	heading	 the	Chamber	dismisses	a	 further	witness	testimony	because	 it	 found	
contradictions,	‘as	to	the	order	to	bring	in	the	bulldozers	[emphasis	added]’	(Seromba	Judgment,	
01‐66‐0276/2:	para	269,	p.	75).	In	light	of	the	fact	that	at	least	1,500	people	died	in	the	church,	it	
seems	rather	unimportant	from	which	direction	and	in	which	order	the	church	was	pulled	down	
by	 a	 precise	 number	 of	 bulldozers.	 As	 Molly	 Andrews	 reminds	 us,	 traumatic	 narratives	 are	
precisely	 marked	 by	 what	 is	 not	 there:	 coherence,	 sequence,	 structure,	 meaning	 and	
comprehensibility	(Andrews	2014:	155;	see	also	Laub	1992:	59‐60).		
	
Against	this	backdrop,	how	does	Jacques	describe	the	events	between	13	and	15	April?	
	
On	13	April	I	came	to	the	church,	leaving	my	hiding	place	with	neighbours.	They	
said	things	were	getting	worse.	But	in	the	church	I	kept	myself	in	the	corner	of	the	
entrance	 and	 my	 children	 were	 gathering	 near	 the	 altar	 together	 with	 other	
children.	They	didn’t	know	I	had	entered	the	church.	I	kept	in	the	corner	all	the	
time	…	My	fellow	businessmen	bet	on	my	life.	If	they	found	me	they	said	to	other	
perpetrators	they	would	give	them	100000	RWF.	On	14	April	many	Tutsi	were	in	
the	church	and	the	Hutus	were	gathering	around	the	church	…	I	managed	to	flee	
the	 priest	 compound.	 They	were	 killing	 the	 whole	 day	 of	 15	 April	 from	 10am	
through	the	night	…	I	left	the	roof	at	9pm	in	the	night	but	killings	still	went	on.	In	
the	night	I	left	I	was	running	around	the	bush	until	I	reached	the	river	Nyaberongo;	
I	knew	how	to	swim	but	I	wanted	the	river	to	kill	me.	I	chose	to	be	drowned	instead	
of	being	killed	by	machetes.	After	what	I	saw	here,	dead	bodies	everywhere,	people	
hacked	into	pieces,	I	really	wanted	to	die.	But	when	I	went	in,	I	managed	to	reach	
the	other	side.	On	the	other	side	was	Gitarama;	I	was	wounded	all	over,	especially	
on	my	legs	because	of	glass,	but	I	could	walk	slowly	until	I	reached	my	younger	
brother,	who	was	living	in	Gitarama.	There,	it	was	somehow	peaceful	because	they	
hadn’t	started	to	kill	there.	But	the	next	day	they	started	killing,	so	I	and	my	family	
went	to	seek	refuge	in	the	marchlands	(Kabgayi)	where	so	many	Tutsi	were.’	
	
In	his	account	of	the	events	between	13	and	15	April	at	Nyange	church,	Jacques	does	not	testify	
according	to	a	descriptive	account	of	what	he	observed,	rather	he	offers	the	very	personal	and	
private	effect	of	survival	and	of	resistance	to	extermination,	the	very	crime	priest	Seromba	was	
found	guilty	of	committing.	His	narrative	account	shows	that	the	act	of	testifying,	in	and	of	itself,	
is	vital	not	so	much	because	of	the	historical	or	legal	information	that	can	be	extracted	from	it	but	
because	of	the	depth	of	darkness	that	it	begins	to	make	visible	to	those	who	were	not	there.	
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Such	stories	testify	to	a	struggle	of	survival	then	and	now	(Hartman	1996:	142).	Jacques	wanted	
to	die,	being	drowned	in	the	river	after	seeing	how	people	were	hacked	into	pieces	by	machetes.	
He	 testifies	 to	 the	 struggle	of	 survival	 and	 in	 that	moment	 also	 to	 the	 cruelty	of	 survival.	His	
account	makes	visible	the	despair	and	betrayal	in	saying	how	Tutsi	believed	the	authorities	that	
they	were	safe	in	the	church.	Further,	he	recalled	how	his	fellow	businessmen	who	knew	Jacques	
for	years	bet	on	his	life	as	if	he	wasn’t	a	human	being,	but	an	object.	His	ordeal	doesn’t	end	at	
Nyange	church	or	in	the	river.	He	has	hope	when	he	arrives	at	his	brother’s	home,	a	treachery	
‘peace’	as	he	describes	it.	But	the	next	day	he	must	learn	that	his	struggle	for	survival	continues.	
His	testimony	breaks	with	the	marchlands.	At	this	point	during	the	testimony,	he	becomes	very	
upset	 and	we	 need	 to	 take	 a	 break.	 Tutsi	were	 hunted	 in	 the	marchlands.	 Accounts	 of	 these	
survivals	are	indeed	‘unspeakably’	horrific	(see	also	Hatzfeld	2007).	
	
Later	in	the	testimony	he	explained	to	me	that	his	father	and	brother	are	not	buried	at	the	Nyange	
memorial.	 Indirectly,	 he	 here	 suggests	 they	both	died	 in	 the	marchlands.	The	darkness	of	 his	
testimony	also	becomes	visible	by	the	way	he	talks	about	his	children.	His	children	were	in	the	
church,	but	he	stayed	in	the	corner	of	the	entrance,	where	they	could	not	see	him.	And,	here,	we	
must	ask	what	does	it	mean	to	know	that	we	cannot	save	our	own	children?	It	is	precisely	this	
silence	that	cuts	through	his	testimony,	the	recollection	of	losing	and	witnessing	the	killing	of	his	
children,	wife,	brother	and	father	(‘I	remember	how	they	were	killed’).	This	mode	of	testimony	
breaks	the	frames	of	law	and	testifies,	on	the	one	hand,	to	its	very	rupture	in	the	wake	of	‘crimes	
against	 humanity’	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 to	 the	 very	 human	 nature	 of	 survival.	 The	 testimonial	
process,	in	a	relationship	between	listener,	the	‘other’	and	narrator,	is	the	place	and	the	process	
in	which	the	traumatic	experience	comes	into	existence	and	is	therefore	knowable.	We	become	
more	 familiar	with	 Jacques’s	 trauma	of	 survival,	 although	we	will	never	 truly	understand	 the	
deeper	meaning	of	the	silences	that	cut	through	his	testimony.		
	
In	contrast,	legal	knowledge	may	produce	vast	numbers	of	‘facts’,	but	the	traumatic	experience	is	
silenced	 because	 the	 trauma	 does	 not	 speak	 from	 the	 language	 of	 facts.	 Consider	 this	 short	
excerpt	from	the	examination‐in‐chief	of	witness	CBN	by	the	prosecutor	to	further	illuminate	this	
point	(TRA003309/1):		
	
Q.	 Without	saying	any	names,	did	anyone	close	to	you	die	at	Nyange	church?	
A.	 Yes,	many.	My	family	members	died	in	Nyange.	Members	of	my	family	died	
at	Nyange.	I	do	not	know	if	I	can	characterise	them	or	to	say	which	members	
of	 my	 family	 are	 in	 question	 or	 say	 exactly	 what	 was	 the	 relationship	
between	them	and	myself.	
Q.	 Can	you	just	say	a	number,	at	this	time,	of	the	close	family	members	that	you	
lost?	You	can	estimate.	
A.	 My	four	sisters	died	at	Nyange.	My	junior	brother	also;	that	makes	five.	If	you	
add	my	father,	that	makes	six.	My	father's	wife	also	died;	that	is	seven.	My	
wife,	herself;	that	makes	eight.	Her	daughter	and	the	children	of	my	sister.	
That	makes	11	people.	There	are	others	who	were	not	in	my	direct	family;	
that	is,	the	members	of	my	father's	family	totalled	11.	
	
The	 prosecutor	 is	 not	 interested	 at	 all	 in	 the	 personal	 loss	 of	 witness	 CBN,	 but	 only	 in	 the	
quantifiable	number	of	family	members	CBN	lost	at	Nyange	church.	In	another	examination‐in‐
chief	of	witness	CBJ,	 the	prosecutor	is	 interested	in	detailed	facts	concerning	the	death	of	one	
particular	person	(TRA003306/1):		
	
Q.		 Did	you	see	Miriam	when	you	were	at	Nyange	church	during	your	stay	from	
the	10th	to	the	16th	of	April?	
A.	 Yes,	I	saw	her.	
Q.	 Did	anything	happen	to	her?	
A.	 Yes.	
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Q.	 Can	you	briefly	explain?	
A.	 Yes.	Miriam	was	the	wife	of	Jean	Kariyanga,	who	was	a	businessman.	At	the	
beginning,	when	people	started	fleeing	and	taking	refuge	at	the	church,	she	
took	refuge	in	the	church	after	the	death	of	Habyarimana.	But	on	the	14th	
[pause]	or	before	the	14th	of	April	1994,	Father	Seromba	[pause]	the	girls	
from	Miriam's	family	and	the	people	who	were	educated,	in	particular	the	
teachers	 [pause]	 so	 Father	 Seromba	 had	 given	 to	 these	 people	 lodgings,	
accommodation	 at	 the	 presbytery.	 But	 on	 the	 14th,	 when	 they	 held	 the	
meeting,	 the	purpose	of	which	was	 to	decide	on	our	being	killed,	he	 sent	
away	these	people	to	whom	he	had	provided	accommodation.	So	Miriam	and	
her	family	joined	us	in	the	church.	I	was	together	with	Miriam	and	her	family	
in	the	church.	And	on	the	15th,	the	doors	were	opened	for	us	and	we	came	
out.	And	after	having	gotten	outside,	during	the	attacks,	Miriam	went	to	the	
same	building	in	which	she	was	before,	and	Father	Seromba,	once	again,	sent	
her	 [pause]	 sent	 away	 the	 people	 who	 were	 in	 the	 rear	 court	 to	 the	
presbytery,	and	where	these	people	were	coming	out,	they	were	being	shot	
at.	Miriam	was	captured	after	she	had	been	sent	away	by	Father	Seromba.	
She	was	beaten	up	in	front	of	the	secretariat,	and	I	saw	people	bring	her	to	
the	front	of	the	church.	I	didn't	quite	observe	the	scene,	but	subsequently	I	
saw	her	mortal	remains,	that	is	the	mortal	remains	of	Miriam.	Her	clothes	
had	been	stripped	off.	She	was	treated	very	shabbily,	and	that	is	what	I	can	
say	that	I	saw	about	Miriam.		
Q.	 Did	you	see	her	clothes	being	removed?	
A.	 Yes,	I	was	an	eyewitness.	Her	body	was	dragged	on	the	ground.	
Q.	 Did	you	recognise	anyone	present	or	perpetrating	that	against	her?	
A.	 Amongst	those	who	were	humiliating	Miriam	[pause]	Mr	Prosecutor,	is	that	
the	person	that	you	want	me	to	say	if	I	saw	any	of	those	that	were	humiliating	
Miriam?	
Q.	 Yes,	and	if	you	did,	please	state	those	names.		
A.	 Those	I	were	able	to	identify,	Kayishema	[pause]	Kayishema	Fulgence,	of	the	
judicial	police.	Miriam	was	dragged	by	a	certain	Murindanyi,	but	 I	do	not	
know	his	first	name.	The	judicial	police	inspector,	Kayishema,	was	holding	
Miriam's	head	and	was	banging	it	against	the	floor	of	the	courtyard.	I	saw	
them	undress	her	and	her	legs	were	spread	apart.	That	was	what	I	was	able	
to	see.		
	
The	prosecutor	does	not	follow	up	on	the	death	of	Miriam,	the	fact	that	she	was	humiliated	or	her	
legs	spread	apart.	Indeed,	the	prosecutor	continues	the	line	of	questioning,	by	simply	asking	‘You	
said	that	Seromba	sent	some	people	out.	Can	you	estimate	the	number	of	people	sent?’	Again,	the	
trial	is	only	interested	in	establishing	meticulous	and	detailed	facts.	Only	minutes	later	CBJ	must	
take	 a	 break.	 He	 says,	 ‘I	 have	 a	 problem.	 Before	 I	 came	 into	 the	 courtroom,	 I	 talked	 to	 the	
prosecutor	regarding	the	wound	I	had	which	I	sustained	as	a	result	of	the	Interahamwe.	My	head	
is	heated	up,	and	I'm	feeling	confused.	This	is	the	situation	I	am	facing	now.	I	don't	think	I	can	
understand	the	questions	that	are	put	to	me	now.’	The	traumatic	experience	of	witnessing	how	
Miriam	died	and	his	physical	 injury,	 is	not	allowed	to	come	through	 in	the	trial.	 It	also	seems	
arbitrary	to	establish	the	fact	of	one	particular	person,	given	that	around	2,500	people	died	in	the	
parish	between	11	and	16	April	1994.	At	the	end	of	the	trial,	the	judgment	establishes	the	death	
of	Miriam	‘beyond	reasonable	doubt’.		
	
In‐between	time	and	timelessness:	Reading	trauma	time	against	chronological	time	
Let	us	revisit	the	chronological	aspects	of	narratives	in	order	to	read	the	testimonial	accounts	on	
the	witness	stand.	Generally,	we	need	narratives	or	stories	to	make	sense	which	they	obtain	by	
giving	them	a	chronological	sequencing	and	instilling	in	them	a	wholeness	they	might	not	have.	
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White	 has	 argued	 that	 events	 are	 expected	 ‘to	 display	 the	 coherence,	 integrity,	 fullness,	 and	
closure	of	an	image	of	life	that	is	and	can	only	be	imaginary’	(White	1987:	24).		
	
I	would	argue	that	this	is	even	more	the	case	in	the	context	of	a	trial.	Events	must	be	told	and	
configured	in	a	way	that	can	be	given	legal	meaning.	In	order	to	produce	a	narrative	that	meets	
the	requirements	of	‘beyond	reasonable	doubt’,	the	testimony	in	court	must	follow	the	traditional	
Aristotelian	narrative	structure.	For	example,	the	examination‐in‐chief	of	witness	CBN	is	pressed	
into	 this	 conventional	 Aristotelian	 structure	 by	 the	 prosecutor’s	 way	 of	 questioning	
(TRA003309/1):	
	
Q.	 Witness	CBN,	there	is	a	photograph	being	displayed;	Prosecutor's	Exhibit	P.	
3‐21.	It's	on	the	screen	before	you.	What	is	in	that	photograph?	
A.	 It	is	a	photograph	of	the	church.	
Q.	 Which	church?	
A.	 It	is	the	Nyange	church.	
Q.	 In	April	1994	did	you	go	to	Nyange	church?	
A.	 Yes.	
Q.	 On	what	day	did	you	arrive	at	Nyange	church?	
A.	 It	was	on	Tuesday,	the	12th	of	April.	
Q.	 Can	you	give	us	an	approximate	time	of	day:	morning,	afternoon,	night?	
A.	 I	got	there	at	about	1	a.m.,	if	I	reckon	it	…	
Q.	 On	what	day	did	you	depart	or	leave	Nyange	church?	
A.	 I	left	the	parish	on	Friday,	the	15th	April.	
Q.	 In	April	1994	who	was	the	parish	priest	at	Nyange?	
A.	 It	was	Seromba.	
Q.	 What	is	that	person’s	other	name?	
A.	 Athanase	Seromba.	
Q.	 On	the	13th	of	April,	did	you	see	Seromba;	yes	or	no?	
A.	 Yes.	
Q.	 Did	you	hear	Seromba	say	anything?	
A.	 Yes,	I	heard	him	say	something	…	
A.	 In	the	morning	we	asked	him	to	say	mass	and	he	told	us	that	he	couldn't	
waste	his	 time	 saying	mass	 for	Tutsi,	 that	 our	 brothers,	 the	 Inyenzi,21	 the	
Tutsi	Inyenzi,	had	attacked	the	country	and	they	had	even	killed	President	
Habyarimana	…	
Q.	 At	which	location	was	Seromba	when	he	said	those	words?	
A.	 He	was	standing	in	front	of	the	church.	
Q.	 Did	you	see	any	weapons	inside	the	church?	
A.	 Yes,	there	were;	there	were	traditional	weapons.	
	
This	 examination‐in‐chief	 illustrates	 how	 the	 prosecutor	 attempts	 to	 establish	 a	 coherent	
sequence	of	the	events	that	happened.	In	the	line	of	questioning	the	prosecutor	continues	to	lead	
the	witness	through	each	day,	until	15	April	when	the	witness	fled	the	parish	thereby	focusing	on	
little	 details	 of	 the	 events	 so	 as	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 what	 happened.	 The	 examination‐in‐chief	
continues,	now	establishing	what	happened	on	15	April	as	follows:		
	
Q.	 I'd	like	to	turn	your	attention	to	the	15th	April	1994,	and	if	you	could	tell	us,	
step	by	step,	what	happened	that	day.	
A.		 Yes,	I	can	tell	you.	In	the	morning	we	faced	the	attacks	that	were	launched	
against	us	until	we	were	beaten	following	the	grenades	that	were	thrown	by	
the	assailants	at	us,	up	until	 the	time	when	I,	myself,	 fled;	 that	was	in	the	
afternoon.	 In	 the	meantime	 this	 is	what	 I	 saw:	 on	 the	 upper	 floor	 of	 the	
building,	Father	Seromba	sought	refuge	there,	but	he	did	not	come	down.	
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Q.	 Before	the	grenades	were	used,	what	weapons	or	 items	were	used	in	this	
attack?	
A.	 The	assailants	were	throwing	stones	at	us	and	we	did	the	same,	and	at	one	
time	 they	 threw	 grenades	 at	 us.	 The	 assailants	 had	 traditional	 weapons,	
spears	and	others.	
Q.	 Was	anyone	affected	by	the	grenades?	
A.	 Some	people	were	affected	by	the	grenades.	I	was	standing	near	a	tree	in	the	
rear	courtyard	of	the	presbytery.	Girls	were	wounded.	I	was	throwing	stones	
while	taking	cover	behind	a	eucalyptus	tree.	
Q.	 Was	anyone	killed?	
A.	 Those	people	moved	towards	the	church.	I	don't	know	whether	they	died,	
but	they	seemed	to	have	died.	
Q.	 Who	was	in	the	church	during	this	attack?	
A.	 I	haven't	quite	understood	your	question,	Prosecutor.	
Q.	 Was	anyone	inside	the	church	at	the	time	of	the	attack?	
A.	 There	were	people	inside	the	church.	Some	people	were	inside	the	church	
while	others	were	defending	themselves	outside.	
Q.	 Did	the	attackers	ever	come	inside	the	church?	
A.	 The	assailants	were	around	the	church.	They	came	into	the	courtyard	when	
we	were	repelled.	They	came	in	a	vehicle	and	they	would	hit	us	with	sharp	
objects.	That	was	when	I	fled	…	
Q.	 Can	you	estimate	the	time	of	day	you	ran	away	from	Nyange	church	on	15	
April?	
A.	 I	fled	in	the	afternoon	at	about	1	p.m.	
	
By	the	way	of	questioning,	the	witness	testimony	is	given	a	wholeness	and	a	legal	meaning	that	
can	be	used	by	the	Chamber	to	make	sense	of	what	happened	and	to	establish	whether	Father	
Seromba	is	guilty	or	not.	The	witness	testimony	has	a	clear	ending,	which	is	at	1:00pm	on	15	April,	
when	witness	CBN	fled	the	parish.	We	do	not	get	to	know	where	his	journey	of	survival	led	him	
to	and	how	it	ended.	The	legal	wholeness	of	the	testimony	is	established	with	the	witness	leaving	
the	‘crime	scene’.		
	
Moreover,	the	trial	is	concerned	with	a	chronological	sequence	of	events	and	with	the	facts	that	
establish	 the	 event	 as	 truthful.	 For	 instance,	 the	 Seromba	 judgment	 is	 structured	 around	 a	
chronology	of	events	that	was	introduced	by	the	indictment	and	maintained	in	the	judgment.	The	
Chamber	begins	the	‘fact’	presentation	with	ruling	that	it	has	been	established	during	the	trial	
that	it	is	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	father	Seromba	‘in	light	of	those	testimonies	…	acted	in	a	
number	of	ways	which	show	that	he	was	responsible	for	the	daily	management	of	Nyange	parish	
during	the	Arpil	1994	events’	(Seromba	Judgment,	01‐66‐0276/2:	para	15,	p.	38).	The	judgment	
continues	detailing	the	events	in	chronological	order	from	6	April	to	16	April.	This	shows	that,	in	
the	 language	of	 law,	 there	must	be	an	exact	chronicle	ordering	of	 temporality.	However,	 such	
precise	temporal	order	can	pose	difficulties	for	traumatic	testimony.		
	
When	 looking	 at	 narratives	 on	 the	 witness	 stand,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 how	 time	 is	
experienced	by	a	survivor	of	atrocity	as	opposed	to	how	legal	procedures	integrate	time	aspects	
in	 constructing	 legal	meaning	 of	 an	 event.	When	 listening	 to	 a	 testimony	 the	 listener	 usually	
ascribes	meaning	to	what	has	been	said	using	a	chronological	timeframe	(beginning,	middle	and	
end)	(Edkins	2003:	xiv‐xv).	As	aforementioned,	the	emplotment	brings	single	occurrences	in	a	
chronological	 order.	 Trauma,	 however,	 changes	 the	 conceptions	 of	 time	 in	 the	 body	 of	 the	
survivor	(LaCapra	2001:	90).	Lawrence	Langer	compounds	further	on	that	point	that,	in	the	body	
of	a	survivor,	there	exist	two	times	(Langer	1997:	57‐58):	a	chronological	and	a	durational	time.	
He	explains	 further	 that	 the	 traumatic	experience	 ‘is	not	part	of	 ...	historical	past,	but	of	 [the]	
durational	present’	(Langer	1997:	59).	Jacques	for	instance	moves	between	time	and	events	in	
his	testimony:		
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On	14	during	the	day	the	Tutsi	won	the	battle;	the	Hutu	did	not	manage	to	come	
in.	In	the	evening	the	bourgemestre	and	other	leaders	and	these	two	businessmen	
had	a	meeting	at	 the	priest	compound.	When	Tutsi	saw	the	authorities	meeting	
there	they	thought	they	might	discuss	ways	to	save	them.	But	this	was	not	true,	
because	next	day,	15	April,	many	cars,	trucks	and	buses	came	full	of	Hutus	with	the	
purpose	to	kill	everybody	in	the	church.	But	after	the	meeting	(30min)	two	of	the	
guys,	a	judge	and	a	policeman	were	also	in	the	meeting.	They	came	to	the	church	
to	collect	Hutu	women	who	were	married	to	Tutsi	men.	They	had	a	list	of	those	
women.	They	were	calling	them	to	come	out.	
	
In	this	part	of	the	testimony,	chronological	temporality	and	coherence	are	lacking.	Jacques	fails	
to	 integrate	 the	events	 in	the	wider	context	he	refers	 to	and	 fails	 to	establish	an	emplotment,	
which	would	bring	the	events	(meetings,	arrival	of	trucks,	the	collection	of	Hutu	women)	into	a	
coherent	order.	The	meeting,	he	talks	about,	in	his	account	happens	on	14	April	and	then	again	
on	15	April	at	the	same	time	when	the	buses,	carrying	Interahamwe	and	probably	villagers,	arrive.	
Clearly	his	point	of	reference	is	not	the	chronology	or	the	facts	of	how	the	events	unfolded	during	
these	days,	but	the	knowledge	that,	with	the	arrival	of	new	forces,	the	Tutsi	in	the	church	and	the	
priest	compound	would	not	be	able	to	defend	themselves.	In	other	words,	they	knew	they	would	
die.	This	account	also	 talks	of	despair	 and	hope	 that	 is	betrayed	when	he	 recalls	 the	meeting	
saying	that	they,	the	Tutsi	in	the	church,	thought	the	leaders	would	discuss	ways	to	save	them.		
	
What	 comes	 alongside	 the	 chronological	 timeframe	 of	 narratives	 is	 a	 suggested	 closure.	 As	
Andrews	(2014)	explains,	the	narrative	configuration	of	linear	time	seemingly	gives	the	trauma	
narrative	what	 it	does	not	have:	an	experience	which	is	contained	 in	time;	an	experience	that	
happened	in	the	past	and	indeed	has	ended,	is	finished	now.	In	the	examples	above	the	witnesses	
must	 be	 able	 to	 narrate	 a	 story	 in	 the	 past	 through	 the	 past	 tense,	which	 suggest	 an	 ending.	
Furthermore,	when	considering	the	trial	judgment,	it	becomes	clear	that	it	forecloses	the	future	
since	the	judgment	is	‘final’;	what	happened	is	past	and	this	is	where	the	legal	story	ends.		
	
Conclusion:	Law’s	past	and	trauma’s	present	
Reading	the	survivor	testimony	against	the	witness	testimony	on	the	witness	stand	has	revealed	
the	 difficulties	 of	 the	 trial	 to	 hear	 and	 address	 the	 trauma	 of	 genocide	 and	 crimes	 against	
humanity.	Felman	reminds	us	that	there	are	limitations	in	the	possibility	of	seeing	and	hearing	
trauma.	She	argues	that	there	exists	a	structural	exclusion	from	our	factual	frame	of	reference	
that	 is	determined	by	a	built‐in	cultural	 failure	to	see,	and	I	would	add,	hear,	 trauma	(Felman	
1997).	Law	is	a	language	of	abbreviations,	of	limitation	and	totalisation	that	rules	out	what	cannot	
be	disclosed	in	language	and	words.	And	this	is	exactly	what	Lyotard	(cited	in	Hirsh	2001:	536)	
prompts	us	to	understand,	when	he	asserts	that	the	perfect	crime	is	not	the	death	of	the	witnesses,	
but	obtaining	the	silence	of	the	witnesses	and	the	deafness	of	the	judges.	To	carry	this	thought	
further,	law’s	story	focuses	on	ascertaining	the	totality	of	facts.	The	facts	of	when,	where,	what	
and	how	many,	 is	what	the	trial	 is	concerned	with.	This	is	the	evidentiary	foundation	that	the	
Chamber	uses	to	rationalise	its	judgment	and	its	legal	quest	for	justice	in	the	Seromba	case.	The	
court	needs	to	establish	the	facts	in	its	totality	as	‘beyond	reasonable	doubt’	in	its	judgment.	But	
as	Arendt	has	argued	in	respect	of	the	Eichmann	trial,	‘reality	is	different	from,	and	more	than,	
the	totality	of	facts	and	events	which	anyhow	is	unascertainable’	(Arendt	1993:	261).		
	
Law	is,	by	definition,	a	 ‘discipline	of	 limits’	(Felman	1997)	that	also	applies	to	the	way	time	is	
understood	 and	 interpreted	 in	 the	 trial	 process.	 The	 analysis	 has	 shown	 how	 the	 cross‐
examination,	 the	 law‐type	 questioning,	 produce	 legal	 narratives	 that	 not	 only	 distance	 and	
totalise	the	singularities	of	‘events’	but	also	form	a	legal	temporality	that	fails	to	include,	admit	or	
acknowledge	 trauma	 time,	 except	 as	 a	 rupture	 of	 the	 legal	 frame.	 Temporality	 is	 indeed	
problematic	with	regard	to	trauma.	The	judgment	makes	past	out	of	the	massacres	that	happened	
at	Nyange	church	and	brought	a	legal	closure	whereas	the	traumatic	experience	for	Jacques	lives	
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in	 the	 present.	 Claude	 Lanzmann,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 Holocaust,	 even	 emphasised	 that	 the	
Holocaust	is	not	a	memory	but	reveals	itself	only	in	a	hallucinated	timelessness	(Lanzmann	cited	
in	Felman	2002:	153),	something	the	trial	can	neither	think	of,	nor	include.		
	
Moreover,	reading	the	survivor	testimony	against	the	witness	testimony	has	highlighted	how	the	
witness	 evidence	 given	 at	 trial	 reveals	 the	 crime,	 while	 the	 survivor	 testimony	 speaks	 to	 a	
traumatic	experience	that	cannot	be	translated	into	legal	idiom.	Alongside	the	crime	comes	the	
position	of	the	‘victim’	as	a	witness	who	in	the	court	procedure	automatically	falls	under	law’s	
scrutiny.	That	is	to	say,	the	witness	is	judged	by	the	credibility	in	the	narrative	account	her	or	she	
testifies	 to	 in	 court.	 But	 as	 the	 analysis	 has	 revealed,	 the	 experience	 produces	 traumatic	
narratives	that	lack	coherency,	closure	and	consistency.		
	
Reading	 trauma	 into	 the	 witness	 stand	 might	 illuminate	 why	 the	 Chamber	 found	 so	 many	
inconsistencies	 in	 witness	 testimonies	 in	 the	 Seromba	 case.	 Indeed,	 as	 Nancy	 Combs	 has	
observed,	inconsistency	in	witness	testimonies	in	international	criminal	tribunals	is	not	only	a	
problem	before	the	ICTR,	but	a	‘serious	problem	in	international	criminal	law’	(Combs	2016:	5).	
Combs	further	argues	that	inconsistencies	arise	when	witness	testimony	diverges	from	pre‐trial	
witness	statements	and	that	those	are	often	related	to	details	of	dates,	distances,	duration	and	
numbers	(Combs	2016:	6).	Combs	argues	that	around	50	per	cent	of	inconsistent	testimonies	are	
given	at	the	ICTR.	She	admits,	though,	that	such	can	occur	due	to	false	testimony,	interpretation	
problems	and	cultural	misunderstandings,	and	claims	that	these	cases	of	inconsistencies	relate	
to	facts	that	‘can’t	be	forgotten	or	confused’.		
	
The	 first	section	of	 this	paper	showed	 that,	 in	 the	early	stage	of	 the	 trial	process,	 the	witness	
statement	 is	already	a	 text	 that	 is	 shaped	by	hierarchical	 encounters	 in	 the	 field	and	 that	 the	
traumatic	experience	is	cleared	out	of	the	‘legal	text’.	This	obviously	poses	a	difficulty	when,	years	
later,	the	accuracy	of	the	witness	testimony	is	assessed	against	this	first	statement	that	is	so	often	
used	in	cross‐examination	to	undermine	the	witness’s	credibility.	The	analysis	has	revealed,	in	
contrast	 to	 Combs	 findings,	 that	 a	 more	 sympathetic	 understanding	 of	 traumatic	 testimony	
appreciates	that,	while	there	is	always	an	oath	to	tell	the	truth,	everything	in	this	truth	can	be	
forgotten	 and	 confused.	 A	 pure	 legal	 perspective	 neglects	 these	 fragments	 of	 both	 traumatic	
memory	 and	 experience.	 I	 therefore	 suggest	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 consider	 reading	 trauma	 into	
inconsistencies	in	witness	testimonies	before	international	criminal	trials	in	order	to	illuminate	
different	perspectives	as	to	why	those	‘inconsistent’	testimonies	occur.		
	
Reading	trauma	into	and	testimony	against	the	witness	stand	importantly	speaks	to	humanistic	
claims	that	storytelling	by	victims	in	juridical	proceedings	is	a	desirable	and	necessary	act	to	build	
collective	peace.	Often	there	have	been	claims	that	victims	are	healed	by	giving	testimonies	in	
court	or	before	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commissions.	Osiel	argues,	for	instance,	that	the	‘victim‐
witness’	 appeals	 not	 only	 to	 the	 judges	 but	 implicitly	 to	 the	 community	 at	 large	 and	 that,	
therefore,	the	legal	arena	provides	the	victim	with	a	superior	platform	to	articulate	their	stories	
as	influencing	the	collective	memory	of	the	events	its	judges	(Osiel	2012:	2,	30).		
	
It	 seems,	 though,	 that	historically	 the	Eichman	 trial	has	been	 rather	an	exception	 in	 the	ways	
‘victim‐witnesses’	were	allowed	to	recall	their	stories	in	court.	The	foregoing	analysis	of	how	the	
witness	is	de‐subjectified	and	how	the	traumatic	experience	is	not	heard	because	it	is	silenced	in	
the	legal	structure	of	the	trial	procedure	has	clearly	shown	that	the	‘real’	story	remains	mute	and	
the	legal	audience	deaf	to	it.	This	dominant	view	that	testifying	in	court	leads	to	a	catharsis	for	
‘victims’	and	an	acknowledgment	of	their	suffering	seems	much	more	debatable	in	trials	such	as	
the	ICTR.	Rather,	the	findings	of	this	paper	seem	to	complement	the	work	of	those	who	argue	that	
today’s	 international	 trials	 leave	 little	 room	 for	witnesses	 to	 tell	 their	 stories	 (Dembour	 and	
Haslam	 2004:	 153).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Rwanda,	 local	 victim	 organisations	 such	 as	 Avega	 (the	
organisation	of	genocide	widows)	or	Ibuka	(the	umbrella	survivor	organisation)	even	refused	to	
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work	with	the	Tribunal	because	of	repeated	mistreatment	and	the	lack	of	protection	of	witnesses	
in	the	court	room.22		
	
As	the	analysis	of	the	court	transcripts	revealed,	the	only	way	to	tell	the	story	is	in	the	form	of	
giving	legal	evidence	that	at	the	same	time	clears	the	human	experience	out	of	the	legal	forum	in	
order	to	establish	a	legally	authoritative	account	of	the	crime	and	of	‘what	happened’.	There	is	an	
inherent	tension	between	the	survivor	who	speaks	on	the	witness	stand	and	whose	story	cannot	
be	heard.	The	survivor	is	only	positioned	as	evidence	with	probative	value	that	fundamentally	
neglects	the	fact	that	he	or	she	has	experienced	inhumane	suffering.	The	court,	therefore,	cannot	
provide	a	testimonial	holding	space	that	would	be	needed	in	order	to	form	and	convey	a	traumatic	
narrative.	The	assumption	of	so	many	scholars	that	victims’	pain	and	suffering	is	acknowledged	
in	 legal	 proceedings	 should	 be	 reconsidered	 and	 challenged	by	more	 empirical	 research.	 The	
results	presented	here	however,	build	a	fruitful	starting	point	to	initiate	a	more	nuanced	debate	
about	the	position	of	victims	in	juridical	proceedings,	nationally	and	internationally.		
	
The	 analysis	 in	 this	 articles	 also	 engages	 with	 the	 critical	 work	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
international	criminal	trials	really	can,	and	do,	write	history	(see	Wilson	2011:	1;	also	Gaynor	
2012;	 Simpson	 2007).	 It	 was	 shown	 how	 the	 trial	marks	what	 history	 remembers	 and	what	
history	 forgets,	 or	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Felman,	 ‘what	 is	 pragmatically	 included	 in	 and	 what	 is	
programmatically	excluded	from	collective	memory’	(Felman	1997:	766).	The	collective	memory	
created	in	court	programmatically	excludes	the	traumatic	testimony,	but	pragmatically	includes	
the	evidentiary	linear	narrative	that	supports	legal	meaning‐making.		
	
This	 leads	 to	 the	 human	 experience	 of	 the	mass	 crime	 being	 cleared	 from	 the	 legal	 records.	
Therefore,	we	need	further	outlets	for	a	traumatic	past	to	emerge,	to	be	heard	and	understood	if	
we	 are	 to	 generate	 a	 fuller	 and	 more	 sensitive	 picture	 of	 mass	 atrocities	 and	 genocide.	
Importantly,	though,	we	must	be	aware	that	law	relates	to	history	through	trauma,	through	the	
social	function	of	the	trial	as	a	structural,	procedural	and	institutional	remedy	to	trauma	(Felman	
1997:	766).	Yet,	as	trauma	studies	teach	us,	a	trauma	cannot	simply	be	remembered	when,	in	the	
first	place,	 it	 cannot	be	grasped,	 transgressed	 into	 language	 (and	 legal	 idiom)	or	heard	by	 its	
(legal)	audience.		
	
In	addition,	trauma	is	constantly	re‐enacted	in	the	present	because	it	cannot	be	transgressed.	But	
law	 closes	 the	 possibility	 of	 reinterpretation	 and	 negotiation	 of	 the	 traumatic	 past,	 and	 the	
judgment	 closes	 all	 meanings	 by	 presenting	 a	 totality	 of	 facts.	 However,	 the	 archive	 of	 the	
tribunal(s)	preserves	the	trauma,	its	incoherence	and	inconsistency;	the	challenge	here	is	to	see,	
understand	 and	 to	 read	 trauma	 into	 the	 archival	 records.	 The	 methodology	 presented	 here	
enables	us	to	assess	this	invisible	traumatic	material	in	a	way	that	lets	us	hear	the	silences	and	
see	the	gaps	that	cut	through	the	testimonies	on	the	witness	stand.		
	
In	conclusion,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	that	 trauma	 is	unique,	both	 individually	and	historically,	
although	some	aspects	of	 it	share	some	characteristics	(Andrews	2014:	148).	That	also	means	
that	the	representation	of	trauma	faces	epistemological	and	ethical	challenges	(Feldman	1991;	
Robben	and	Nordstrom	1995;	Young	1988).	As	researchers	we	should	be	cautious	when	arguing	
to	 ‘speak	 for	 the	 subaltern’	 or	 ‘give	 voice’	 to	 victims,	 particularly	 when	 the	 research	 is	
characterised	by	hierarchical	encounters	between	global	North	and	global	South.	Robben	and	
Nordstrom	 importantly	 note	 that	 ‘one	 can	 count	 the	 dead	 and	 measure	 the	 destruction	 of	
property,	but	victims	can	never	 convey	 their	pain	and	suffering	 to	us,	other	 than	 through	 the	
distortion	 of	word,	 image	 and	 sound.	 And	 rendition	 of	 the	 contradictory	 realities	 of	 violence	
imposes	order	and	reason	on	what	has	been	experienced	as	chaotic’	 (Robben	and	Nordstrom	
1995:	12).	We	have	come	across	this	 in	the	witness	testimonies	and	in	Jacques’	story.	Yet	this	
paper	has	rendered	this	contradictory	reality	meaningful	by	providing	it	the	linear	(beginning,	
middle,	 end)	narrative	 structure	 that	 is	needed	 to	understand	and	 contextualise	what	 is	 said,	
written	 and	 heard,	 and	what	 is	 ultimately	 needed	 to	write	 an	 academic	piece	 of	work.	When	
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writing	about	narratives	of	violence,	we	must,	therefore,	reflect	on	our	own	subject	position	in	
the	broader	epistemological	community	and	how	this	impacts	on	the	way	we	present	and	make	
use	of	traumatic	experiences	in	our	work.	Nevertheless,	this	paper	has	hopefully	contributed	to	
the	project	of	southern	criminology	and	its	democratisation	of	knowledge	production	by	making	
visible	the	invisible,	the	marginal	and	the	excluded.	
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7	The	Great	Lakes	Region	comprises	of	the	countries	Rwanda,	Burundi,	Uganda	and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo.	
8	 It	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 article	 of	 further	 elaborate	 on	 this	 point	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 witness	 is	
desubjectified	within	the	trial	process	due	to	legal	frameworks	and	political	power	struggles	between	the	parties	to	
the	trial.	The	author	is,	however,	working	on	a	publication	that	shows	and	analyses	these	hidden	processes.	
9	Giorgio	Agamben	has	differentiated	between	witnesses	as	superstes	and	as	testis.	The	latter	can	be	understood	as	a	
‘legal	witness’	whereas	the	superstes	is	a	survivor	in	the	full	sense,	who	is	characterised	by	remembering	the	events	
(see	Agamben	2008:	17‐26).	
10	The	reaffirmation	of	the	story	is	crucial	because	the	traumatic	event	is	an	absent	event	that	has	yet	to	be	remembered	
and	told.	The	specific	of	trauma	is	that	the	‘Thou’	is	annihilated	and	thus	the	event	is	not	experiences	as	real.	Through	
the	 testimonial	 process	 however	 the	 event	 becomes	 ‘real’	 by	 remembering	 and	 telling	 it.	 The	 listener	 must	 be	
prepared	in	the	dialogic	relationship	to	acknowledge	that	the	survivor	not	only	does	not	know	what	he	or	she	will	
testify	to	but	also	fears	that	knowledge	since	it	blurs	all	boundaries	of	subjectivity.	The	secret	password	is	related	to	
an	unspoken	empathy	when	the	listener,	too,	has	experienced	a	traumatic	event	so	that	the	listener	has	a	profound	
understanding	of	what	it	means	to	testify	(see	further	Caruth	1998;	Laub	1992,	2005).		
11	I	did	not	ask	about	the	ethnicity	of	the	individuals	I	spoke	to.	Ethnicity	is	a	very	sensitive	topic	in	Rwanda	and	has	
been	banned	by	 law	from	politics	and	society.	Moreover,	 it	would	be	regarded	as	very	rude	to	ask	for	someone’s	
ethnicity	in	Rwanda.	In	addition,	the	ethnicity	did	not	play	a	role	in	my	research	since	I	enquired	about	the	experience	
of	the	genocide	and	what	the	memorials	and	commemoration	meant	for	them.	
12	The	CNLG	members	of	staff	are	mostly	survivors	as	well	but,	given	the	politicised	context	in	Rwanda,	I	did	not	select	
those	individuals	for	the	survivor	testimonies.		
13	Often,	though,	survivors	would	have	experienced	violence	at	not	only	one	place.	Jacques,	for	example,	survived	the	
Nyange	massacre	and	then	fled	to	Gitarama,	where	he	survived	in	the	marchlands.		
14	Moreover,	a	case	was	not	tried	before	the	ICTR	for	every	memorial	at	which	I	conducted	survivor	testimonies.		
15	This	case	was	tried	in	London	under	the	War	Crimes	Act	of	1991.	Andrei	Sawoniuk	was	a	member	of	a	Nazi‐organised	
police	force	that	operated	in	and	around	a	small	town	in	Belorus	and	that	was	tasked	with	killing	Jews.	He	was	found	
guilty	of	murder.	
16	Interahamwe	literally	means	‘those	who	work	together’.	The	Interahamwe	was	a	militia	founded	by	the	MDR	political	
party	in	1994.	The	Interahamwe	operated	country‐wide	and	was	responsible	for	organising,	planning	and	carrying	
out	massacres.	Leaders	of	the	Interahamwe	have	been	tried	before	the	ICTR,	including	Georges	Rutaganda,	head	of	
the	Interahamwe.		
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17	For	a	recollection	of	the	killings	from	a	survivor	perspective,	see	also	Jean	Hatzfeld	(2007,	2010).	
18	Witness	BZ1	states	in	his	witness	testimony	that	he	witnessed	how	Anicet	Gatare	asked	a	gendarme,	in	exchange	of	
some	money,	to	be	killed	in	order	avoid	an	atrocious	death	[by	a	machete	or	club].	Gatare	was	killed	as	a	matter	of	
fact.	 However,	 the	 Chamber	 could	 not	 establish	whether	 this	 happened	 through	 a	machete	 or	 through	 shooting	
(Seromba	Judgment,	01‐66‐0276/2:	para	200,	p.	56).	
19	Anasthase	Nkinamubanzi	appeared	before	court	as	well	and	was	a	defence	witness.	On	the	stand	he	claimed	that	he	
was	coerced	 to	drive	 the	bulldozer.	Witness	FE31	 testified	 that	another	driver	who	was	asked	 to	bulldoze	down	
Nyange	church,	refused	to	follow	the	order	and	was	killed.	The	Chamber	regarded	this	statement	as	not	credible.		
20	Indeed,	in	the	examination‐in‐chief	of	prosecution	witness	CDL,	he	refers	to	Jacques’	vehicle	and	states,	 ‘he	was	a	
Tutsi	and	his	vehicle	was	taken	away	from	him.	He	had	gone	into	hiding.	During	that	period	[name	redacted]	was	the	
driver	of	that	car’	(TRA003315/2).	
21	Inyenzi	is	the	Kynarwanda	term	for	cockroach	and	was	used	to	refer	to	Tutsi	during	the	genocide.		
22	A	 report	by	 the	 International	 Federation	 for	Human	Rights	 into	 the	 treatment	of	witnesses	before	 the	Tribunal	
concluded	that	the	complaints	raised	by	those	survivor	organisations	were	justified	(October	2002,	No	329/2).	
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